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factors mediating these outcomes – as 
well as more practical outcomes such as 
educational and occupational attainment 
– relate to both pre- and post-resettlement 
experiences. Pre-resettlement factors 
supporting positive settlement outcomes 
include younger age on arrival and more 
years of pre-migration education; post 
settlement, strong networks and social 
support have a powerful impact, and strong 
ethnic identity is also valuable. Experiences 
of discrimination have the most significant 
adverse impact upon self-reported health and 
well-being and the pursuit of education.
It is therefore critical to address 
discrimination, increase the pathways 
through which refugee youth can access 
social goods and opportunities such as 
education and employment, and promote 
connections to people and place. This 
will increase the effectiveness of refugee 
resettlement programmes over the longer 
term, supporting young people with 
refugee backgrounds to achieve their 
aspirations and pursue positive futures.
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Rejecting resettlement: the case of the Palestinians 
Anne Irfan
Palestinian rejection of resettlement was driven by political concerns. This case study shows 
the importance of engaging directly with refugees when devising durable solutions. 
Over their seven decades as a large-scale 
refugee population, the Palestinians have 
been remarkably consistent in collectively 
opposing resettlement as a durable solution 
to their plight. Both the grass roots and 
later the Palestine Liberation Organisation 
(PLO) have repudiated any suggestion of 
third-country resettlement on the grounds 
that it would undermine the Palestinians’ 
political and national rights as a people. Host-
country integration was similarly spurned. 
The Right of Return
The Palestinian refugees’ vehement 
opposition to resettlement is explained 
by their equally vehement attachment to 
repatriation. The right of return has been a 
central tenet of the Palestinian nationalist 
movement since 1948 when many Palestinian 
refugees left their homes believing that 
they would return shortly, as a result often 
taking only a few belongings with them. 
While events on the ground put paid to these 
immediate plans, they did not destroy the 
hope of eventual return in the future. On the 
contrary, the collective Palestinian desire for 
repatriation remained strong, buoyed by the 
United Nations’ (UN’s) formal endorsement of 
the right of return in Resolution 194. Calls for 
the realisation of this right became central to 
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Palestinian political discourse, and Resolution 
194 remains a popular and effective rallying 
cry today. When Palestinian President 
Mahmoud Abbas said in 2012 that he was 
willing to forgo his right to return to his 
hometown of Safad, his comments provoked 
outrage across the diaspora. 
Palestinian opposition to resettlement 
must be understood within this context. 
Resettlement as a durable solution is 
by implication mutually exclusive with 
return. Many Palestinian refugees have 
feared, sometimes with good reason, 
that resettlement schemes are politically 
motivated and designed to undermine 
their political cause by ‘solving’ their 
problem once and for all. Resettlement was 
thus never seen as a purely humanitarian 
solution but was always politically tainted. 
The PLO institutionalised this widespread 
hostility to the idea by formally opposing 
any international plans for either host state 
integration or third-country resettlement. 
Failed resettlement 
The refugees’ resistance to resettlement was 
fuelled by resettlement’s perceived connection 
to the UN. Many Palestinian refugees were 
suspicious of the international community in 
general and of the UN in particular, which 
they perceived as biased towards Israel. The 
programmes put forward by the UN with 
the unofficial aim of facilitating resettlement 
did nothing to allay such concerns. 
In the first decade after 1948, the UN 
focused on attempting to resettle the 
Palestinian refugees into either the (Arab) 
host states or third countries (usually also 
imagined as Arab countries). This was in 
keeping with the post-war international 
preference for resettlement over return. 
Moreover, this seemed the most feasible 
solution for the Palestinian refugees in 
view of Israel’s refusal to countenance 
their return. It was thought that resettling 
the Palestinian refugees across the Arab 
world would be straightforward in view of 
their shared linguistic and cultural ties. 
On the world stage, both the United 
States (US) and the United Kingdom (UK) 
favoured this option. This was particularly 
significant as it was the US and the UK that 
championed and largely funded the UN Relief 
and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees 
(UNRWA), which had been established in 1949 
as a specialist body for the Palestinian crisis. 
While its primary focus was on relief, in the 
1950s it also became the focus for broader 
resettlement plans for the Palestinians. The 
‘Works’ of its title referred to job schemes 
designed to facilitate the refugees’ economic 
development and local integration. In 1952 
the UN General Assembly 
even authorised a UNRWA 
Reintegration Fund for the 
precise purpose of resettling 
the refugees outside Palestine. 
Such plans were 
overwhelmingly opposed and 
rejected by the Palestinian 
refugees themselves. 
Observing that the Works 
schemes presupposed their 
futures outside Palestine, the 
refugees largely declined to 
enrol and participate. Their 
intransigence, combined with 
the costly nature of the schemes, 
led UNWRA to eventually 
abandon the programme, 
switching its emphasis in the 
late 1950s to education. Yet the 
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Mural in a Palestinian refugee camp in the West Bank, calling for the right of return.
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Works schemes’ impact far outlasted their 
duration, and resettlement has remained 
a major source of tension and suspicion in 
the refugees’ relationship with UNRWA. It 
is an early example of the lasting damage 
that can be caused when humanitarian 
planning fails to take sufficient account 
of the refugees’ own expectations. 
On similar grounds, the Palestinian 
refugees also resisted UNRWA’s efforts to 
develop and stabilise the infrastructure in 
their camps in the 1950s. In the eyes of the 
refugees, these moves were another part of the 
same plan to permanently settle them outside 
Palestine. In response, they uprooted trees 
planted by UNRWA in the camps, sprayed 
structures with red anti-resettlement slogans, 
demonstrated and went on strike. Their 
opposition was so vehement that UNRWA 
was unable to implement its plans, another 
instance of the problems caused by inadequate 
engagement with the refugees themselves.
Hostility from the Palestinian refugees 
was not the only reason that resettlement was 
never implemented or seriously pursued. 
There was also a major obstacle in the form 
of opposition from the Arab states, both 
those already hosting large Palestinian 
refugee populations, and those who might 
be targeted for third-country resettlement 
schemes. With the possible exception of 
Jordan, these governments feared that 
resettlement would compel them to absorb 
large numbers of refugees as citizens. The 
Arab states consistently spoke at the UN 
against resettling the Palestinians, calling 
rather for return as the only viable and 
acceptable solution. Without Arab support, 
resettlement stood little chance and in 1987 
the UNRWA Commissioner-General Giorgio 
Giacomelli stated that although the agency 
had been conceived with the intention of 
facilitating resettlement, financial and political 
factors had rendered this impossible.1 
Individual resettlement 
The PLO too actively opposed resettlement, 
insisting that UNHCR, the UN Refugee 
Agency, not pursue this for the Palestinians. 
The PLO’s opposition was grounded 
in the concern that resettlement would 
fragment the Palestinian diaspora and 
thereby undermine their collective national 
rights as a people. Crucially, it explicitly 
requested that individual Palestinians 
refrain from applying for asylum in the 
West, fearing that any such moves might 
enable resettlement ‘by the back door’.
Notwithstanding this, many individual 
Palestinians have successfully pursued 
third-country resettlement, acquiring 
citizenship in Europe, North America 
and Latin America. In the vast majority of 
cases they have done so while continuing 
to identify as Palestinian refugees and still 
favouring repatriation as a long-term solution 
for the exiled community as a whole. 
Emigration to Western states received 
legal backing in 2012 from a ruling in the 
European Court of Justice, which created 
a precedent for Palestinian eligibility to 
claim asylum in Europe.2 Even the PLO 
has reportedly softened its stance on 
individual resettlement, acknowledging 
that it is not necessarily incompatible 
with collective repatriation rights. 
The issue of individual resettlement has 
taken on a new significance in the context of 
the Syrian crisis. Syria historically provided 
some of the best conditions and entitlements 
for Palestinian refugees in the Arab world, a 
situation that has been grotesquely inverted 
by the current war. Since 2011, more than 
100,000 Palestinians have fled their homes 
in Syria, becoming second-time refugees. As 
first Jordan and then Lebanon have closed 
their doors to Palestinians from Syria, some 
are now looking to Europe for refuge. 
The plight of Palestinians fleeing Syria 
has highlighted some of the long-term 
problems facing Palestinian refugees in 
general. Their affiliation to UNRWA rather 
than UNHCR places them at a unique 
disadvantage, rendering them ineligible for 
the large-scale resettlement programmes 
organised through the latter. Instead, they 
must make individual asylum applications, 
and often do not qualify as political refugees 
or even as stateless persons. Their legal 
vulnerability means that Palestinians can 
be denied the protections afforded to other 
refugees, including regarding resettlement. 
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The resettlement of Polish refugees after the second 
world war
Agata Blaszczyk 
The passing of the Polish Resettlement Act and the creation of the different agencies 
related to it undoubtedly represented an unprecedented response to the challenge of mass 
migration in the UK. 
When it became clear in 1945, at the end of the 
second world war, that the Polish forces and 
refugees abroad would not be able to return 
to their homeland, the British government 
took on responsibility for them. The first step 
was the founding of the Polish Resettlement 
Corps (PRC) in May 1946. Almost a quarter 
of a million Polish servicemen supporting 
the Western Allies found that they could 
not return home. Soldiers and airmen 
serving overseas were to be helped through 
the Corps to stay in the United Kingdom 
(UK) and settle into civilian life there. 
Service in the Corps was intended to be an 
opportunity for retraining and education; it 
was agreed with the British trade unions that 
prospective Polish employees could only be 
recruited from the PRC and would be placed 
in ‘approved’ Ministry of Labour jobs. 
The 1947 Polish Resettlement Act aimed 
to resettle political refugees in the UK, at 
a time when it was on the verge of an era 
of considerable population increase based 
largely on immigration. The Act provided 
Polish refugees in the UK with entitlement to 
employment and to unemployment benefit. 
The Act also laid out the responsibilities 
of several government departments 
to provide health services, pension 
entitlement and education for the Poles. 
The Act was welcomed in parliament 
and considered to be an act of great 
statesmanship – an act that changed people’s 
attitudes to the foreigners then arriving. 
Conclusion
The Palestinian refugee situation is in many 
ways exceptional. Its longevity, scale and 
institutional uniqueness all distinguish it 
from most other refugee situations. It can 
nevertheless offer valuable lessons, not least 
when it comes to resettlement.
In the case of the Palestinians, 
resettlement not only failed but barely got off 
the ground. While the refugees’ opposition 
to it was driven by political concerns, the 
situation was not helped by the failure of 
international humanitarians to engage with 
them directly. The result has been lasting 
mistrust and suspicion that have continually 
plagued the refugees’ relationships with 
UNRWA in particular, and the UN in general.
The suspicion felt by many Palestinian 
refugees towards resettlement was also 
due to the perceived implications of the 
solution’s permanence. This is certainly not 
exceptional, in view of many refugee groups’ 
continuing preference for repatriation over 
other solutions. If people wish ultimately to 
return home, they are less likely to embrace 
measures that they fear will undermine 
their ability to do so. It is therefore worth 
exploring ways of re-constructing the 
‘three durable solutions’ so as to allay such 
anxieties. The Palestinian case shows that if 
resettlement can be devised and fashioned 
so as not to undermine the possibility of 
eventual return, it may prove more palatable. 
Finally, it is worth remembering that 
UNHCR itself continues to hold up voluntary 
repatriation as the preferred durable 
solution for all refugees, and resettlement 
as the last resort. On this the Palestinian 
refugees are firmly aligned with the UN.
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